Questions for the Peddlers of Islamic “Radicalisation” Kool Aid Same type served at Jonestown, Guyan
When you study the attackers involved in the Madrid bombings 2004, the Paris 2015 attacks, the Nice 2016 attack, the Brussels 2016 attack, the Berlin 2016 attack and the Istanbul attack on Club Reina 2017 you discover the stark contrasts in behaviour which point to motivation, acting upon their worldview and the presumed dynamic between the process of radicalisation and human action by the radicalisation proponents. Analysis of action taken by the attackers illustrate a range of choices made in the course of the attack as follows: those who died as a result of their participation in the military assault with those who died by their own hands in the assault being the apex of this group, those who survived the attack and chose to die at their own hands rather than surrender to the enemy/kaffirun, those who survived the attack refused to surrender and chose to die not by their own hands but in a firefight with the enemy/kaffirun, those who took part in all aspects of the logistics of the attack but in the heat of battle refused to execute the task charged with and then surrendered to the enemy, those who took part in the logistics of the attack up to the pre-attack stage fleeing before the attack commenced and those who willingly and effectively killed then fled and surrendered to the enemy refusing to utilise the military resources at hand to engage in a firefight seeking death or to die by their own hands. From this range of actions gleaned from the named series of attacks it is apparent that in the actual heat of battle the attacker can and will undertake actions that are contrary to what they signed up for and to the supposed worldview that “radicalised” them. Those seeking causal explanations can only guess and infer as they were not exposed to the impact of the heat of battle and its impact on the person furthermore they don’t share the same discourse and its worldview. Just another limit to causal empiricism and the limit to all human knowledge of a reality that you didn’t fabricate I suggest you experience the Copenhagen interpretation of Quantum Mechanics. The ultimate ideal is those who died in the course of their attack but those who chose to die at their own hands or at the hands of the enemy after the attack or before the attack are the those fit to be emulated as paragons of obedience as they chose death over life to ensure the security of the operation and their freedom from subjection to the order of the kaffirun. There were attackers who never experienced battle previously and received no training to prepare them for the attack who executed and ensured they escaped capture through death. Whilst there were those who were trained experienced battle and “radicalised” by members of an Islamic extremist group who refused to die to evade capture by the enemy or failed to execute their task fled and duly surrendered to the kaffirun. In fact, from the evidence an attacker can be over “radicalised” to the point of cowardice and failure under fire as some of the most committed attackers were not graduates of this process as they were apparently deeply motivated by their life experiences and their worldview. We have one instant where one brother faithfully died at his own hands for his task was to be a suicide bomber whilst his brother refused, ditched his gear, fled and allowed himself to be captured. Why the “radicalisation” resonated with one brother and failed with the brother who was reported as a player in the command structure of the group but chose in the heat of the engagement to abort, flee and surrender whilst his brother only had his commitment to the cause and he died by his hands? Then there is the case of a reported player escorting two attackers to the attack site who then left the site before the two attackers detonated their devices and when cornered by the enemy peacefully surrendered to them and this reality also applied to the other so-called “radicalised” attacker who escorted an attacker left before he detonated his device at the attack site and when cornered peacefully surrendered to the enemy. Is there a differentially structured radicalising programme where a hierarchy is created with the facilitators exempt from attaining the condition of being Shahid? Why does an attacker who reportedly successfully completed various training programs, who then successfully penetrated the borders of the state in which the attack was made and ruthlessly murdered persons in a mass killing then simply disappear peacefully surrender when cornered even though possessing the means to engage in a firefight and leave this world in a blaze of glory? Another case of differentially structured “radicalisation”?
The most potent of all these attacks were carried out by persons versed in the illicit underworld of the EU so it was with Madrid, Paris, Brussels, Nice and Berlin with attackers from the illicit underworld being the model to emulate as they carried out their attacks and died during or after the attacks. The peddlers of “radicalisation” kool aid need now to understand how the illicit life prepares an individual to become an effective killer of civilians. Stop the distraction with the “radicalisation” in prison discourse as this does not give an attacker the means, wherewithal, resources and cojones to become a mass murderer learn from Anis Amri. In a social order where the proceeds of crime are part of the licit financial order then the illicit underworld thrives generating a series of threats as the illicit order evolves. The issue is not then “radicalisation” but the nexus between globalised financial markets and the illicit order and the constituting of individuals fit, ready and able to execute extremist attacks on the citizens of the state.