EUROPOL’s DISCOURSE OF MIGRANT SMUGGLING IN THE EU

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Europol entered the field of monitoring migrant smuggling in the EU in the aftermath of the Islamic extremist attacks and the threats posed to the EU by the human wave of migrants flooding into the EU. Europol and Interpol produced the report “Migrant smuggling networks Executive Summary” dated May 2016 in which the public discourse of Europol and Interpol on migrant smuggling was revealed. The key findings of the report are: 1. More than 90% of the migrants to the EU are facilitated and a significant number by organised crime. 2. Migratory pipelines are fluid, constantly evolving in response to realities on the ground especially to controls on the movement of migrants as is the case in 2016 with the Balkan route. 3. Migrant smuggling is a multinational business in the EU with suspected smugglers originating from over 100 countries both members and non-members of the EU. 4. The common smuggling network comprises facilitators, organisers and leaders with the use of persons of the same ethnic origin as migrants to solicit business and facilitate the trafficking process. The process of the absorption of networks by larger and more powerful groups has commenced. 5. The report estimated that the annual turnover for migrant smuggling crime groups in the EU was USD 5-6 billion in 2015. 6. The cost of the services of the smuggling groups must be paid in cash which spawns a reality that impacts the migrant who chooses to contract said services and the smuggling organisations. 7. The threat posed by persons and organisations intent on attacking the EU using the migrant flow and organised crime to enter the EU illicitly and undetected as in the case of the Paris 2015 attacks.

Analysis of the key findings

Finding 1. Given the remit of Europol and Interpol to “facilitate” a migrant in the EU has to entail the facilitation/enabling of migrants to break the laws of EU member states and affiliates and of the EU itself. This is further complicated and enhanced by an organised crime group whose business model is itself illicit as it offers illicit services for sale to migrants in a joint endeavour to flout the law. By contracting and paying for the illicit services of individuals and/or organised crime groups the migrant is willingly part of a criminal enterprise as their demand for illicit services is the basis of the sustainability of the criminal enterprise. No demand simply no supply. Migrants are not a homogeneous mass as there are individuals and groups within the migrant mass conscious of their need to illicitly breach EU borders and simply disappear into the social order of multiple member and/or affiliate states for various reasons. Such migrants depart from supply countries to the EU utilising organised crime groups for their journey to the staging points for entry to the EU and then contract organised crime groups for their journey through the EU. In fact, there are now seamless service providers that provide the illicit services needed for the entire desired journey of the EU migrant for the right price. The illicit services demanded by migrants can only be effectively supplied by organised transnational crime hence the dominance of organised crime in providing such services in the EU. The central question is can you afford the nature of the journey you desire? Those who can experience a reality that those who cannot will never experience as there is a brutal hierarchy of privilege as facilitators cobble together cost variable packages and those who can only afford the low cost packages become the most abused of the paying clients and those who cannot afford none of the above become commodities to be disposed of as income generating assets that have willingly accepted the terms and conditions of an illicit undertaking. Such is the order of organised crime as demand drives integration and maximisation of profit and the move to dominate markets to the detriment of small players. Any change in the volume of migrant flow and the monetary resources they command organised crime will simply sublet their turf to vassals who pay taxes for the use of the turf. These vassals are under pressure to produce and then the model goes to extremes: sexual slavery, sale of children to paedophiles and forced labour.

Key finding 2. Migratory pipelines are under constant change in response to counter measures put in place by governments and to realities on the ground especially within the power relations of organised crime that dominate the pipelines. The fact that they are constantly under change and new pipelines are created potently illustrates the power organised crime exerts over migrants as their desire to reach this brave, new world makes them risk accepters and more importantly paranoid about failing which influence choices made and passivity in dealing with the facilitators they have paid for services. To romanticise migrants and the conditions they say they are fleeing from is a refusal to deal with the reality that the entire process is defined by the strategies of organised crime in order to generate wealth from human suffering and insecurity caused by politicians and their political action nationally and transnationally. Politicians and organised crime are then locked in yet another instance of symbiosis as the war on drugs and all the other wars. The underclass of migrants the paramount victims are those who cannot pay for the services of organised crime thereby becoming the throw away people immersed by their desperation and suffering on a journey where the conditions they are forced to live in can be worse than those they fled from as is the case of African economic migrants trapped in Libya. Such is the daily reality of Africans on their journey to Italy via Libya but the primary concern of the EU at present is the South-East/Balkan routes. In the case of the EU as with other cases political action conditions the illicit enterprise clearly seen in the appreciable fall in migrants to the EU utilising the South-East/Balkan routes and the obverse where in the absence of political action especially in the non-state of Libya the Central Mediterranean route has had no fall in volume but an increase in 2016. The symbiosis at play.

Key findings 3, 4, 5 & 6. The nature of the illicit enterprise especially the fact that humans are being moved profoundly impacts the nature of the organisations. Every client is a potential informer, a witness for the state and can jeopardise the security of the enterprise by various kinds of recalcitrant behaviour along the route. The enterprise then demands minimum exposure of the command and control structure of the organisation to the client and the clients being moved in a group has to be docile, disciplined and dutiful. Handlers faced with a group/individuals/individual that refuses to surrender to the order of the handlers will use any means necessary to ensure compliance including threats and violence. The multi-racial, multi-ethnic nature of the migrant flow demands handlers who must be able to communicate with the clients as the theatre of operations is entirely different from the supply countries. In the EU the migrants are visible minorities with the vast majority having no command of the range of languages they will traverse on their journey through the EU. The handlers must be multi-faceted as they must be able to communicate with some sample of migrants whilst being functionally capable of communicating within the EU and most of all having the legal status to withstand scrutiny as the group is moved through the EU. Various members of various ethnicities and races must then comprise the group and this impacts the group at the operational leadership level which handles the handlers. But the level above this level, the leader, the question arises of who the leader answers to because to believe that the structure of the enterprise peaks at this level and there is no level above this leaves the command and control level masked as all the other levels listed in the report are expendable and are culled as the conditions dictate. The report estimates that in 2015 the turnover from migrant smuggling was USD 5-6 billion which completes the picture of the operational migrant smugglers must surmount in order to be a sustainable illicit enterprise with the most problematic being the laundering of the cash they are paid for their services as with all illicit enterprises this is a cash driven enterprise.

The operational realities

Is it a simple coincidence that the major migrant smuggling pipelines into and within the EU utilise the pipelines through which transnational organised crime move illicit drugs, smuggle humans and small arms into and within the EU? This is most potently apparent with the pipeline into Italy and the Balkan route. Can human smuggling networks operate in the spaces dominated by powerful transnational and globalised organised crime groups without the consent of these groups? Can these dominant groups allow these small scale groups to generate a turnover of USD 5-6 billion in 2015 without moving to dominate this illicit trade? In the illicit world it simply is not real to posit yes to all these questions and any and all reports which don’t see the hand of hegemonic organised crime groups at the level of command and control in the business of migrant smuggling in the EU need to be scrapped and re-done as they don’t reflect reality on the ground. This is most glaring in the case of Italy where landing zones from Libya and the routes out of Italy are all dominated by the Coca Nostra, the Ndrangheta, the Camorra and Sacra Corona Unita to name the powerful. To expect that these groups especially the globalised Ndrangheta will not exercise its hegemony over these spaces and exploit this business opportunity is reporting on a reality manufactured by those who called for the reports and did the reports. The same applies to the Balkan route where hegemonic organised crime moving heroin, cocaine, marijuana, small arms and humans to and within the EU dominate these spaces. The expertise, logistics and operational networks necessary to generate an estimated turnover of USD 5-6 billion in 2015 were all operational under the hegemony of these groups before the demand for illicit services from migrants escalated from 2014. How then can groups enter the spaces they control establish networks independent of these hegemonic groups with the necessary expertise to generate USD 5-6 billion in 2015 without being in themselves transnational organised crime groups and exerting hegemony over the established overlords? The position then doesn’t match the realities of globalised organised crime in the EU. Those then that speak of race and ethnic minorities within the EU exercising control over spaces in the EU under the control of EU race and ethnic groups that dominate EU organised crime are touting a discourse of a reality/a discourse of truth that exists only in a political agenda. The comparative advantage wielded by globalised EU organised crime is graphically illustrated by migrants with designer luggage and clothing on of the same origin having arrived in Sweden crossing the square and entering the police station to register as a migrant that fled a war zone. The journey to Sweden avoided all of the barriers placed in the way of the migrant flow both licit and illicit this is what top dollar packages deliver as they tap into the range of assets already possessed by these organisations especially purchased impunity from state agencies, counterfeit documents that withstand state scrutiny, the logistics of functioning multiple trafficking pipelines and the means to launder illicit funds in the licit financial system. There is then a division of labour premised on a hierarchy which is the creation of globalised organised crime. Those who deal at the lower end of the market either do so under the command and control of globalised organised crime or pay taxes to and pay for the services of the dominant groups or all of the above.

What is the reality for those migrants who are seeking the services of the smugglers but can’t afford it or are extorted by the smugglers to the point where their resources have dried up? The decision to smuggle persons on credit and to have in your possession persons who are unable to satisfy demands for cash is an operational decision that has to be made given the nature of the operational theatre of the EU and the risks posed to the organisation by the outcomes of said acts. For those cells and families already in the business of various forms of slavery within premier EU organised crime the primary issue will be the level of profits weighed against risks posed to the unit and the overarching organisation. Those small organised groups involved in migrant smuggling the lure of profits to be generated by slavery is a potent attraction with grave potential risks to the group and those they sell services to. The EU market for slave labour is presently served by aggressive organisations with a penchant for violence to protect and expand their operational circuits and they will pose grave threats to these independents especially along the Balkan route. The central issue then in this scenario as always is the response of the policing agencies and the relevance of policing operations to reality on the ground. Manufactured reality that informs policing is the genesis of impunity which organised crime feeds on.

Key finding 7

Islamic State (IS) pursued a strategy of engagement with the civilian population of Syria and Iraq that was intent on creating an exodus of migrants to the EU. This IS strategy was unwittingly embraced by EU politicians stimulating a tsunami of migrants that granted success to the IS strategy to an extent IS never expected and a neo-nazi backlash throughout the EU where Muslims are the primary threat and internal enemy of the EU which IS planned for and pursued. The use of the uncontrolled migrant flow that exposed succinctly the gaping holes in the EU’s security architecture as an operational vehicle by which to transport personnel to attack the EU by IS was the means to further stimulate the neo-nazi backlash against Muslims and to illustrate the insecurity that plagued the citizenry of the EU. The abiding lesson to the EU is that the politicians of the EU who continue to pursue their personal agendas for legacy projects and renewing their hold on the member state can and do perilously jeopardise the security and sustainability of the EU project. This reality will impact the politics of the EU for some time birthing questions of its sustainability. As those determined to make war on the EU in the name of Islam are in the EU and those willing to utilise racist extremist violence to solve the perceived problem are now visibly apparent in the social order and in the politics of the day. The hubris of the politicians of the EU some more than others has then changed the structure of the threat landscape of the EU creating multiple sources of threats including threats from indigenous discourse created by European social orders across time. Racist extremist European nationalism is now engaging with the symbol of their perceived existential threat Muslims in the EU in an increasingly violent manner in a power relation in which the politicians who created the problem are largely bystanders.

 One reality that is never articulated in the public domain is the range of threats that flowed within and amongst the uncontrolled flow of migrants especially in 2015. The fixation with Islamic extremism has not placed the spotlight on other threats as criminals, predators sexual and otherwise and members of organised crime groups sent to exploit the open borders to enter the EU legally and illicitly with the task of establishing or enhancing an operational presence in the EU towards exploiting the single market. Criminals, predators and organised crime view the migrant tsunami to and within the EU as a windfall to exploit as with all windfalls it’s expected that it’s unsustainable. These groups will utilise the services of the migrant smugglers to effect their surmounting of all obstacles to achieving their ends thereby impacting the landscape of criminality in the EU and especially of organised crime. The tsunami of migrants will then expand the operational horizons both in the EU and globally especially in the Middle East which will immediately benefit globalised groups as the Ndrangheta enabling them to be players in the quest to open new drug markets in the Middle East and to use it as a transition zone to Asia. Syrian organised crime already experienced in trafficking captagon to the Middle East will play a key role in this new alliance made operationally even more likely by the migrant tsunami to the EU.

 The report lists the migrant trafficking pipelines as follows: The Western Mediterranean from North Africa especially Morocco to Spain and Portugal which is also a major trafficking pipeline for illicit drugs into the EU with a counter flow from the EU to Morocco of various illicit goods. The Central Mediterranean from Libya to Italy which is also a major route for cocaine moved from West Africa to North Africa through the Sahel and Sahara to Libya then Italy under the control of powerful Italian organised crime primarily the Ndrangheta. The South-Eastern pipeline from Turkey to Greece and Bulgaria then to the Balkan pipeline via Macedonia and Serbia then into the EU at Croatia and Slovenia which is also a major route for heroin moving to the EU along with marijuana, small arms and smuggled humans. The Eastern pipeline from Belarus, Moldova, Ukraine and Russia to the EU and the Nordic pipeline from Russia to Norway and Finland. The report indicated that in 2015 the South-East and Balkan pipelines were dominant routes and in 2016 the Central Mediterranean is dominant clearly the result of the political arrangement with Turkey. African migrants dominate the Central Mediterranean pipeline as they undertake the journey from various parts of Africa to Libya at great peril and suffering seen in the violence and exploitation they experience with the EU response being markedly different to their response to the South-East and Balkan pipelines.

The diversity and multiplicity of migrant routes to the EU potently indicate that the process is planned, organised and informed by the realities of the geography and the political order of the EU. The fact that the dominant migrant pipelines to the EU coexist with major illicit trafficking pipelines to the EU which predated the migrant flow and organised crime groups operating these pipelines have all the necessary experience and resources to smuggle migrants to and within the EU point to the hegemonic position organised crime exerts over migrant smuggling in the EU. As demand for their migrant smuggling services grew EU organised crime framed, defined and facilitated the illicit trade that emerged as a profit centre. On the South-East/Balkan pipelines in spite of the appreciably reduced flow of migrants in 2016 the demand for their services have increased as internment camps, border fences and other measures instituted by EU states drive this escalation in demand with the consequent rise in the cost of services to migrants. The question then in 2016 is what options are available for those migrants who cannot afford the services of the smugglers. At that point slavery and bondage at the hands of the smugglers beckon.

<https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/europol-and-interpol-issue-comprehensive-review-migrant-smuggling-networks>

The “EPMT daily monitoring report” dated June 17, 2016 reports that in 2015 0.2% of payments to smugglers was by labour exploitation of migrants and in 2016 this figure rose to 5%. In 2015 52% of payments for services was by cash and in 2016 it rose to 64% which indicate that the crime groups continue to exist on cash as prices have risen because of growth in demand. No organised crime smuggling network will sacrifice immediate cash payments for services for transporting a migrant for bondage and exploitation sometime in the future. They can demand and collect cash and then choose to subject the client to bondage such is the impunity enjoyed by the service provider over a client that is a willing party to an illicit enterprise. The report stated that migrant smugglers were linked to other criminal activities as follows: drug trafficking 18%, human trafficking 12% and property crime 28% which indicates the criminal experience of smugglers especially with the activities associated with the existing illicit pipelines along the routes of migrants but what is absent from the report is their standing better yet rank within these trafficking organisations. Note carefully that they are criminally experienced in areas vital to the migrant smuggling enterprise. The “EPMT 1 year special edition” dated September 10, 2016 shows the changes in the criminal experience of smugglers that is the result of specialisation within the enterprise as political decisions impact the flow in the S-E/Balkan route with drug trafficking 15%, human trafficking 20% and property crime 23%. The emphasis is now on experienced human traffickers given the changed operating conditions which have caused a spike in demand for services of a specific type. This report indicated that the pipeline from Italy passes through Switzerland and Austria which demands the utilisation of groups of experienced EU human smugglers and traffickers. Organised crime groups that dominate these pipelines in 2016 are farming out smuggling contracts to affiliate groups and to groups and individuals willing to work as affiliates of the affiliates of EU dominant organised crime and in this operational scenario migrants held in bondage for exploitation will become common. The affiliates of the affiliates and the affiliates of organised crime are under constant and severe pressure to earn and pass the proceeds less their share up the line and this pressure coupled with the desire for wealth and power feeds profit maximisation by any means necessary. The threats multiply to the social order arising from hubris.

These operational realities are illustrated in the report by the changes in the top 10 nationalities of reported suspects of migrant smuggling in their order of dominance. In 2015: Romania, Egypt, Syria, Poland, Tunisia, Hungary, Bulgaria, Iraq, Turkey and the UK. In January to August 2016: Turkey, Syria, Romania, Bulgaria, Egypt, Iraq, Ukraine, Poland, UK and Senegal. The nationalities from the EU with human smuggling expertise and networks in the EU as Ukraine is now in the top 10 in 2016 though absent from it in 2015 whilst those who can communicate with the migrants from the Middle East to solicit clients and to be part of the smuggling network are still in the top 10 and are the public faces of the illicit business. The change in the nature of demand in 2016 has impacted the order of the top 10 and in 2016 Hungary is no longer there. Senegal is now in the top 10 as a result of the wave of African migrants which points to its potency in 2016. What is noteworthy in both tables is the presence of Poland in both even though it’s not a major destination point for migrants whilst Germany, France and Italy are not in the lists. Clearly there is a hierarchy within the division of labour of the smuggling organisation largely premised on race, ethnicity and the dominance of globalised organised crime.

<https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/latest-trends-migrant-smuggling-nearly-7000-suspected-smugglers-reported-increased-exploitat>

<https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/latest-trends-migrant-smuggling-epmt-one-year-anniversary-infographic-0>

Lessons from groups dismantled 2016

A Europol press release dated May 31, 2016 “Dozens arrested for massive document forgery and migrant smuggling” reported that 16 persons were arrested in Greece on suspicion of document forgery on a massive scale and migrant smuggling and 3 in the Czech Republic. There was a network of organised crime groups involved in large scale production and distribution of falsified and forged documents namely passports, ID cards and visas to non EU nationals. The documents produced were distributed via courier services to EU member states and to Africa, the Middle East and Asia. The group forged documents to enter the EU or to legalise residence in the EU. Greece was the operational base where two groups one composed mainly of Bangladeshi nationals and the other of Sudanese nationals operated parallel of each other. The price of the products of the criminal enterprise would range from EUR 300 to EUR 3000 per item depending on quality, type and country of issue. The range of documents was as follows: passports, national ID cards, Schengen visas, driving licences, asylum seeker’s registration cards and residence permits. A group in the Czech Republic affiliated to the groups in Greece purchased stolen and lost identity and travel documents and sent them to Greece for falsification upon return from Greece the group distributed these documents in addition to the forged Schengen visas they produced.

A group comprising non EU nationals who are visible minorities in the EU had the capacity to marshal the resources to create and manage a transnational organised crime enterprise in Greece and the Czech Republic in spite of EU organised crime. Groups whose existence was commonly known on the ground in Greece as migrants and other informed the media of such groups as the source of their fake documents as early as 2015 if not before. There are a range of inputs necessary to produce quality fake and falsified documents which means that these groups of non EU nationals commanded the resources to source sustainably these resources in the EU. The reality that matches reality on the ground is that the sourcing of the inputs especially quality inputs, the quality work in demand and command and control were all in the hands of EU organised crime with all the groups dismantled being affiliates of organised crime charged with being in possession of the illicit products, dealing with the customer base and collecting the proceeds of crime under strict observation and supervision of the dominant organised crime group. The low hanging fruit was then harvested and quickly replaced as it’s in the interest of hegemonic organised crime to enable policing agencies to harvest low hanging fruit from time to time to indicate that they are in fact effectively handling the problem. The description of the entire operation presents a picture of an organised crime group that was much too sophisticated to be easily dismantled in one fell swoop. Command and control was then not part of the groups as it was external and overarching of these groups in order to create space in which to operate with the ability to regenerate the illicit enterprise in the event of its demise by limiting damage. You limit damage by an operational procedure in which the only way to dismantle the command and control group is to penetrate the group through informers necessary to case building. A long and costly process that cannot assure success hence you pick the low hanging fruit that is offered and you prize the media exposure that follows for it’s a political game of smoke and mirrors.

<https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/dozens-arrested-massive-document-forgery-and-migrant-smuggling>

A Europol press release dated June 2, 2016 “Europol supports Hungarian-Slovakian team in dismantling migrant smuggling network” reports that 7 suspects were arrested in Slovakia involved in smuggling migrants from Hungary to Germany by car belonging to an organised smuggling network. This organised crime group comprised Afghan nationals who were the recruiters or those who solicited migrants to purchase the services of the group and drivers from Slovakia who transported the clients from Budapest to Germany. The press release gave no details on the role of the Hungarians who were members of the crime group. There was no information also on the command and control structure of the group. As is the case of the previous press release analysed the same questions arise in this case and remain unanswered.

<https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/europol-supports-hungarian-slovakian-team-dismantling-migrant-smuggling-network>

A Europol press release dated July 25, 2016 “Austria, Hungary and Europol dismantle migrant smuggling ring” reports that an organised crime group comprising of 25 members involved in migrant smuggling was dismantled with six members arrested in Austria and one in Hungary. The group comprised mainly of Russian nationals of Chechen origin residing in Austria transported customers illegally from asylum reception centres in Hungary to Austria via various routes including through Slovakia to Austria. Asylum seekers in Hungarian centres who are Afghan, Iranian, Iraqi and Syrian nationals were smuggled by this crime group. The cost of transport was EUR 300 per person from Hungary to Vienna and EUR 700 to 800 per person from Hungary to Germany. What is noteworthy is the operational mode of this group as a Syrian national was the single key logistical figure in the operation as this person was known to the recruiters in the Hungarian refugee camps and was responsible for recruiting drivers in Austria and despatching them to Hungary. As with the two previous releases the question of the supply and sale of the necessary documents to the clients is not dealt with as being transported and seeking to blend into an EU city without an EU valid identity document defeats the purpose of paying to be smuggled. Where is the command and control structure of this group a most valid question because the release insists that the group was dismantled? Were the Chechens in command and control remains unanswered. To have a single individual in control of two distinct arms of the transport operation is not valid accepted operational procedure for organised crime which points to a crime group formed out of a common need to exploit a market in the hope of becoming players as they are certainly not players and are taking risks that a dominant crime group will not take as the method is compartmentalisation premised on a cellular structure. Very, very low hanging fruit easily given up by dominant organised crime to cull the herd of pretenders as they pose risks to the enterprise with their sloppy undisciplined methodology

<https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/austria-hungary-and-europol-dismantle-migrant-smuggling-ring>

A press release dated September 6, 2016 “Eurojust and Europol support major operation against illegal migrant smuggling” reports that a major operation led by Italian authorities against an organised crime group involved in migrant smuggling resulted in the arrest of 16 suspects of Syrian, Algerian, Egyptian, Lebanese and Tunisian nationality and the dismantling of the group. The group smuggled mainly Syrian migrants to and within the EU via the Balkan route to Hungary and Italy then to Austria, France and Germany. The drivers who transported the migrants were recruited in Italy and the vehicles, 80-90 in number, utilised in the illicit enterprise were sourced in Italy. The crime group from 2014 to 2016 was reported to have moved 200 migrants at EUR 500 per migrant. The Italian authorities including its anti Mafia group initiated the assault on this group precipitating EU joint action to dismantle it but to have moved 200 migrants from 2014 to 2016 at EUR 500 each indicates that this was a junior smuggling operation. Simply an affiliate of dominant organised crime highly likely Italian organised crime hence the use of Italy as a major operational node with a number of other affiliates still in operation. The quantum of profit to be generated by dominant EU crime groups involved in the EU drug trade straddles profits that can be possibly generated by smuggling migrants especially those who simply cannot afford the top end packages. The entry of non-affiliated crime groups into pipelines dominated by premier organised crime demands their response as this is the rule of the game. The nature of that response is the product of the power relations that impact the crime groups, the migrants and the member state in their danse macabre.

<https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/eurojust-and-europol-support-major-operation-against-illegal-immigrant-smuggling>

Two press releases in October 2016 are included as they illustrate realities highlighted in this study. A press release dated October 12, 2016 “Hungary concludes investigation into the death of 71 migrants” reported that 11 key facilitators mostly Bulgarian and Afghan nationals of a transnational organised crime group were charged with the murder of 71 migrants and aggravated migrant smuggling by Hungary. On August 26, 2015 a 7.5 tonne refrigerated vehicle loaded with 71 migrants set out from Hungary close to the Hungary-Serbia border on August 27, 2015 the said vehicle was found abandoned in Austria with 71 dead migrants in the refrigerated cab. The smugglers loaded the cab with the migrants failing to provide ventilation for the cab and refusing to leave the rear door of the cab opened. The persons inside died as a result of asphyxiation. The refrigerated cab of a 7.5 tonne vehicle cannot accommodate 71 humans comfortably for a journey from Hungary to Germany as they are forced to stand literally in each other’s face and rear for the duration of the journey. It is expected that the door of the cab cannot be left open for the journey as it will signal an aberration to authorities to have a refrigerated cab with the door open. But no concealed ventilation spaces were fabricated by the smugglers which meant that this smuggling trip was designed as a disaster waiting to happen and it did. The press release does not say what was the cost per migrant for a smuggling trip as this and its methodology reeks of the one used by smuggling operations who view their clients as throw away humans who purchased a bare bones budget package. Was this death trip an exception or the rule of this so-called transnational organised crime group? I expect that it was the rule. A so-called transnational organised crime group that reeked of incompetence that resulted in their downfall indicates that they lacked the resources and experience necessary to a sustainable trafficking operation. Petty small time hustlers seeking to make quick money by any means necessary at the peak of demand in 2015. The fact that large amounts of the proceeds of smuggling were sent to Afghanistan and invested in real estate indicate what this reckless hustle was all about. A transnational organised crime group would have invested in Afghan heroin brought into the EU. The entire operation described in the press release is one under extreme operational and environmental pressure by a powerful organised crime group and they were purged. These are the groups that pose the gravest threats to the security of migrants contracting their services. Europol’s definition of what constitutes transnational organised crime is simplistic and does not reflect the criterion of the illicit world on the ground and the strict hierarchy that exists and is strenuously policed with graphic, extreme violence when and where necessary.

<https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/hungary-concludes-investigation-death-71-migrants>

A press release dated October 11, 2016 “Europol delivers crucial support to international operation leading to seizure of about 100 tonnes of hashish” reports that on September 23, 2016 a ship with 12 crew members (11 Ukrainians and 1 Uzbek) was intercepted on its way to Libya with 19.6 tonnes of hashish on board by a joint Spanish, French, Italian and Europol operation on the Mediterranean Sea. During the second half of 2015 4 cargo ships with over 61 tonnes of cannabis resin were interdicted in Palermo, Malaga, Cagliari and Palermo, with 46 crew members arrested. The press release sates that the drug traffickers were also facilitators of criminal migration, cocaine trafficking and possibly weapons trafficking. The release also states that the revenue from these illicit enterprises “may be destined to finance the activities of terrorist groups or their associates.” Salient questions arise that Europol doesn’t answer and cannot answer. Why were 19 tonnes of hashish heading to Libya via the sea? The cargo is stored in Libya and smuggled into Italy. Is this group and groups like this landing product at Italian ports under the control of Italian organised crime namely Palermo and Cagliari without being affiliates of Italian organised crime? The group was landing product at ports in Italy and Spain and the combination of hashish, cocaine, human smuggling and weapons smuggling potently indicates that the group is in fact a mirror image of the business model of the Mexican transnational trafficking organisations operating in the EU. The group is then an affiliate of Mexican transnational trafficking organisations in the EU and as such is an affiliate of Italian and Spanish organised crime. Because of its product mix such groups will conduct business with extremists who are illicit traffickers in the transition zones on the way to the EU. The rules of engagement for the EU are entirely different as this is the primary consumer market and extremist attacks impact the maximisation of profit. In the absence of evidence placed in the public domain Europol’s press release is driven by a political agenda that is willing to generate fear and create a threat from nothing whilst it masks the nature of the threat posed by the transnational traffickers and its affiliates in the EU. The Mexican traffickers are operationally active in the EU. Deal with it.

<https://www.europol.europa.eu/content/europol-delivers-crucial-support-international-operation-leading-seizure-about-100-tonnes-ha>

 The press releases analysed are constructed for organisational political purposes not for revealing to the public the reality of the threat environment. Important operational questions remain unanswered as succinct details are hidden even though their placement in the public domain will not jeopardise the cases of those charged. The public is then left with the only choices of accepting official discourse or seeking to understand the masked reality with their own actions. This is then an example of the deliberate attempt to create experts peddling the only truth which relentlessly strives for hegemony it is then a discourse of truth. Those seeking hegemony are then drinking the Kool aid they are selling hence the collapse of the paradigm. An incestuous relationship with the device that serves power is not exercising power and when you fail to exercise power it’s exercised on you just look around.